| Exam Board | AQA |
|---|---|
| Module | D2 (Decision Mathematics 2) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Session | June |
| Marks | 14 |
| Paper | Download PDF ↗ |
| Mark scheme | Download PDF ↗ |
| Topic | Dynamic Programming |
| Type | Zero-sum game optimal mixed strategy |
| Difficulty | Standard +0.3 This is a standard textbook exercise in game theory requiring routine application of dominance, play-safe strategies, and graphical solution of 2×3 games. While multi-part with several marks, each step follows a well-rehearsed algorithm with no novel insight required—slightly easier than average A-level maths. |
| Spec | 7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08b Dominance: reduce pay-off matrix7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method |
| Callum | ||||
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | \(\mathbf { C } _ { \mathbf { 1 } }\) | \(\mathbf { C } _ { \mathbf { 2 } }\) | \(\mathbf { C } _ { \mathbf { 3 } }\) | |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | \(\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 1 } }\) | 5 | 2 | - 1 |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } Rose | \(\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 2 } }\) | - 3 | - 1 | 5 |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | \(\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 3 } }\) | 4 | 1 | - 2 |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | ||||
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | ||||
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| Play-safe strategy for Rose is \(R_1\) | B1 | |
| Reason: maximum of row minima; min of \(R_1\) is \(-1\), min of \(R_2\) is \(-3\), min of \(R_3\) is \(-2\); \(-1\) is largest | B1 | 2 marks |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| Play-safe for Callum: column maxima are 5, 2, 5; minimum is 2, so Callum plays \(C_2\) | M1 | |
| Saddle point would require Rose's play-safe to equal Callum's play-safe value; \(-1 \neq 2\), so no stable solution | A1 | 2 marks |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| \(R_3\) is dominated by \(R_1\) (every entry in \(R_1 \geq\) every entry in \(R_3\)) | B1 | 1 mark |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| \(E(C_1) = 5p + (-3)(1-p) = 8p - 3\) | B1 | |
| \(E(C_2) = 2p + (-1)(1-p) = 3p - 1\) | B1 | |
| \(E(C_3) = -p + 5(1-p) = 5 - 6p\) | B1 | 3 marks |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| Three straight lines correctly drawn on graph for \(0 \leq p \leq 1\) | M1 A1 | 2 marks |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| Optimal point is intersection of \(E(C_2)\) and \(E(C_3)\): \(3p-1 = 5-6p\) | M1 | |
| \(9p = 6\), so \(p = \frac{2}{3}\) | A1 | |
| Rose plays \(R_1\) with probability \(\frac{2}{3}\), \(R_2\) with probability \(\frac{1}{3}\) | A1 | 3 marks |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
| Value of game \(= 3(\frac{2}{3})-1 = 1\) | B1 | 1 mark |
# Question 3:
## Part (a)(i)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Play-safe strategy for Rose is $R_1$ | B1 | |
| Reason: maximum of row minima; min of $R_1$ is $-1$, min of $R_2$ is $-3$, min of $R_3$ is $-2$; $-1$ is largest | B1 | 2 marks |
## Part (a)(ii)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Play-safe for Callum: column maxima are 5, 2, 5; minimum is 2, so Callum plays $C_2$ | M1 | |
| Saddle point would require Rose's play-safe to equal Callum's play-safe value; $-1 \neq 2$, so no stable solution | A1 | 2 marks |
## Part (b)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| $R_3$ is dominated by $R_1$ (every entry in $R_1 \geq$ every entry in $R_3$) | B1 | 1 mark |
## Part (c)(i)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| $E(C_1) = 5p + (-3)(1-p) = 8p - 3$ | B1 | |
| $E(C_2) = 2p + (-1)(1-p) = 3p - 1$ | B1 | |
| $E(C_3) = -p + 5(1-p) = 5 - 6p$ | B1 | 3 marks |
## Part (c)(ii)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Three straight lines correctly drawn on graph for $0 \leq p \leq 1$ | M1 A1 | 2 marks |
## Part (c)(iii)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Optimal point is intersection of $E(C_2)$ and $E(C_3)$: $3p-1 = 5-6p$ | M1 | |
| $9p = 6$, so $p = \frac{2}{3}$ | A1 | |
| Rose plays $R_1$ with probability $\frac{2}{3}$, $R_2$ with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ | A1 | 3 marks |
## Part (c)(iv)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Value of game $= 3(\frac{2}{3})-1 = 1$ | B1 | 1 mark |
---
3 Two people, Rose and Callum, play a zero-sum game. The game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for Rose.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ l | r | r | r | r | }
& \multicolumn{4}{c}{Callum} \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& & $\mathbf { C } _ { \mathbf { 1 } }$ & $\mathbf { C } _ { \mathbf { 2 } }$ & $\mathbf { C } _ { \mathbf { 3 } }$ \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& $\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 1 } }$ & 5 & 2 & - 1 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
Rose & $\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 2 } }$ & - 3 & - 1 & 5 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& $\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 3 } }$ & 4 & 1 & - 2 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& & & & \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item State the play-safe strategy for Rose and give a reason for your answer.
\item Show that there is no stable solution for this game.
\end{enumerate}\item Explain why Rose should never play strategy $\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 3 } }$.
\item Rose adopts a mixed strategy, choosing $\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 1 } }$ with probability $p$ and $\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 2 } }$ with probability $1 - p$.
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item Find expressions for the expected gain for Rose when Callum chooses each of his three possible strategies. Simplify your expressions.
\item Illustrate graphically these expected gains for $0 \leqslant p \leqslant 1$.
\item Hence determine the optimal mixed strategy for Rose.
\item Find the value of the game.
\end{enumerate}\end{enumerate}
\hfill \mbox{\textit{AQA D2 2007 Q3 [14]}}