| Exam Board | AQA |
|---|---|
| Module | D2 (Decision Mathematics 2) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Session | June |
| Marks | 15 |
| Paper | Download PDF ↗ |
| Mark scheme | Download PDF ↗ |
| Topic | Groups |
| Difficulty | Easy -2.5 This is a misclassified question - it's actually about game theory (zero-sum games, pay-off matrices) from Decision Mathematics, not group theory from Further Pure Mathematics. The question involves routine application of standard algorithms (finding play-safe strategies, checking for saddle points, dominance, and solving 2×2 games), which are mechanical procedures requiring minimal mathematical insight. Even within Decision Mathematics, this represents straightforward textbook exercises. |
| Spec | 7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08b Dominance: reduce pay-off matrix7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method |
| Juliet | ||||
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | Strategy | D | E | F |
| A | 4 | - 4 | 0 | |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } Romeo | B | - 2 | - 5 | 3 |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | C | 2 | 1 | - 2 |
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | ||||
| \cline { 2 - 5 } | ||||
| 4 | 5 | - 1 |
| 0 | - 3 | 2 |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Romeo: row minima are \(-4, -5, -2\); maximin \(= -2\), so play-safe strategy is C | M1 A1 | M1 for finding row minima |
| Juliet: column maxima are \(4, 1, 3\); minimax \(= 1\), so play-safe strategy is E | A1 | (Juliet minimises, so looks at column maxima then takes minimum) |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Maximin \((-2) \neq\) minimax \((1)\), so no stable solution | B1 | Must state both values and conclude |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Strategy D is dominated by strategy F (or E): every entry in column D is greater than or equal to corresponding entry in column F (or E), so Juliet (minimiser) would never play D | B1 |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Since D is dominated/never played, remove column D. The matrix for Juliet is the negative of Romeo's pay-off matrix (zero-sum game), so negate remaining entries and transpose | M1 | |
| This gives the \(2 \times 3\) matrix shown with rows E, F for Juliet against Romeo's strategies B, C | A1 | Accept clear explanation referencing negation of Romeo's values |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Let Juliet play E with probability \(p\) and F with probability \((1-p)\) | M1 | |
| Against B (row 1): \(5p + (-3)(1-p) = 8p - 3\) | M1 | Setting up expected values |
| Against C (row 2): \(-p + 2(1-p) = 2 - 3p\) | A1 | |
| Set equal: \(8p - 3 = 2 - 3p \Rightarrow 11p = 5 \Rightarrow p = \frac{5}{11}\) | DM1 A1 | |
| Optimal strategy: play E with probability \(\frac{5}{11}\), play F with probability \(\frac{6}{11}\) | A1 | |
| Check against row with \(-1, 2\): verify this is optimal | A1 |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Value \(= 8\left(\frac{5}{11}\right) - 3 = \frac{40}{11} - \frac{33}{11} = \frac{7}{11}\) | B1 ft | Follow through from (d)(ii) |
## Question 5:
**(a)**
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Romeo: row minima are $-4, -5, -2$; maximin $= -2$, so play-safe strategy is **C** | M1 A1 | M1 for finding row minima |
| Juliet: column maxima are $4, 1, 3$; minimax $= 1$, so play-safe strategy is **E** | A1 | (Juliet minimises, so looks at column maxima then takes minimum) |
**(b)**
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Maximin $(-2) \neq$ minimax $(1)$, so no stable solution | B1 | Must state both values and conclude |
**(c)**
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Strategy D is dominated by strategy F (or E): every entry in column D is greater than or equal to corresponding entry in column F (or E), so Juliet (minimiser) would never play D | B1 | |
**(d)(i)**
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Since D is dominated/never played, remove column D. The matrix for Juliet is the negative of Romeo's pay-off matrix (zero-sum game), so negate remaining entries and transpose | M1 | |
| This gives the $2 \times 3$ matrix shown with rows E, F for Juliet against Romeo's strategies B, C | A1 | Accept clear explanation referencing negation of Romeo's values |
**(d)(ii)**
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Let Juliet play E with probability $p$ and F with probability $(1-p)$ | M1 | |
| Against B (row 1): $5p + (-3)(1-p) = 8p - 3$ | M1 | Setting up expected values |
| Against C (row 2): $-p + 2(1-p) = 2 - 3p$ | A1 | |
| Set equal: $8p - 3 = 2 - 3p \Rightarrow 11p = 5 \Rightarrow p = \frac{5}{11}$ | DM1 A1 | |
| Optimal strategy: play E with probability $\frac{5}{11}$, play F with probability $\frac{6}{11}$ | A1 | |
| Check against row with $-1, 2$: verify this is optimal | A1 | |
**(d)(iii)**
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Value $= 8\left(\frac{5}{11}\right) - 3 = \frac{40}{11} - \frac{33}{11} = \frac{7}{11}$ | B1 ft | Follow through from (d)(ii) |
---
5 Romeo and Juliet play a zero-sum game. The game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for Romeo.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ l | c | c | c | c | }
& \multicolumn{4}{c}{Juliet} \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& Strategy & D & E & F \\
\hline
A & 4 & - 4 & 0 & \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
Romeo & B & - 2 & - 5 & 3 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& C & 2 & 1 & - 2 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
& & & & \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item Find the play-safe strategy for each player.
\item Show that there is no stable solution.
\item Explain why Juliet should never play strategy D.
\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item Explain why the following is a suitable pay-off matrix for Juliet.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c | c | }
\hline
4 & 5 & - 1 \\
\hline
0 & - 3 & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\item Hence find the optimal strategy for Juliet.
\item Find the value of the game for Juliet.
\end{enumerate}\end{enumerate}
\hfill \mbox{\textit{AQA D2 2013 Q5 [15]}}