AQA D2 2013 June — Question 5 15 marks

Exam BoardAQA
ModuleD2 (Decision Mathematics 2)
Year2013
SessionJune
Marks15
PaperDownload PDF ↗
Mark schemeDownload PDF ↗
TopicGroups
DifficultyEasy -2.5 This is a misclassified question - it's actually about game theory (zero-sum games, pay-off matrices) from Decision Mathematics, not group theory from Further Pure Mathematics. The question involves routine application of standard algorithms (finding play-safe strategies, checking for saddle points, dominance, and solving 2×2 games), which are mechanical procedures requiring minimal mathematical insight. Even within Decision Mathematics, this represents straightforward textbook exercises.
Spec7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08b Dominance: reduce pay-off matrix7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method

5 Romeo and Juliet play a zero-sum game. The game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for Romeo.
Juliet
\cline { 2 - 5 }StrategyDEF
A4- 40
\cline { 2 - 5 } RomeoB- 2- 53
\cline { 2 - 5 }C21- 2
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\cline { 2 - 5 }
  1. Find the play-safe strategy for each player.
  2. Show that there is no stable solution.
  3. Explain why Juliet should never play strategy D.
    1. Explain why the following is a suitable pay-off matrix for Juliet.
      45- 1
      0- 32
    2. Hence find the optimal strategy for Juliet.
    3. Find the value of the game for Juliet.

Question 5:
(a)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Romeo: row minima are \(-4, -5, -2\); maximin \(= -2\), so play-safe strategy is CM1 A1 M1 for finding row minima
Juliet: column maxima are \(4, 1, 3\); minimax \(= 1\), so play-safe strategy is EA1 (Juliet minimises, so looks at column maxima then takes minimum)
(b)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Maximin \((-2) \neq\) minimax \((1)\), so no stable solutionB1 Must state both values and conclude
(c)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Strategy D is dominated by strategy F (or E): every entry in column D is greater than or equal to corresponding entry in column F (or E), so Juliet (minimiser) would never play DB1
(d)(i)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Since D is dominated/never played, remove column D. The matrix for Juliet is the negative of Romeo's pay-off matrix (zero-sum game), so negate remaining entries and transposeM1
This gives the \(2 \times 3\) matrix shown with rows E, F for Juliet against Romeo's strategies B, CA1 Accept clear explanation referencing negation of Romeo's values
(d)(ii)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Let Juliet play E with probability \(p\) and F with probability \((1-p)\)M1
Against B (row 1): \(5p + (-3)(1-p) = 8p - 3\)M1 Setting up expected values
Against C (row 2): \(-p + 2(1-p) = 2 - 3p\)A1
Set equal: \(8p - 3 = 2 - 3p \Rightarrow 11p = 5 \Rightarrow p = \frac{5}{11}\)DM1 A1
Optimal strategy: play E with probability \(\frac{5}{11}\), play F with probability \(\frac{6}{11}\)A1
Check against row with \(-1, 2\): verify this is optimalA1
(d)(iii)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Value \(= 8\left(\frac{5}{11}\right) - 3 = \frac{40}{11} - \frac{33}{11} = \frac{7}{11}\)B1 ft Follow through from (d)(ii)
## Question 5:

**(a)**

| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Romeo: row minima are $-4, -5, -2$; maximin $= -2$, so play-safe strategy is **C** | M1 A1 | M1 for finding row minima |
| Juliet: column maxima are $4, 1, 3$; minimax $= 1$, so play-safe strategy is **E** | A1 | (Juliet minimises, so looks at column maxima then takes minimum) |

**(b)**

| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Maximin $(-2) \neq$ minimax $(1)$, so no stable solution | B1 | Must state both values and conclude |

**(c)**

| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Strategy D is dominated by strategy F (or E): every entry in column D is greater than or equal to corresponding entry in column F (or E), so Juliet (minimiser) would never play D | B1 | |

**(d)(i)**

| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Since D is dominated/never played, remove column D. The matrix for Juliet is the negative of Romeo's pay-off matrix (zero-sum game), so negate remaining entries and transpose | M1 | |
| This gives the $2 \times 3$ matrix shown with rows E, F for Juliet against Romeo's strategies B, C | A1 | Accept clear explanation referencing negation of Romeo's values |

**(d)(ii)**

| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Let Juliet play E with probability $p$ and F with probability $(1-p)$ | M1 | |
| Against B (row 1): $5p + (-3)(1-p) = 8p - 3$ | M1 | Setting up expected values |
| Against C (row 2): $-p + 2(1-p) = 2 - 3p$ | A1 | |
| Set equal: $8p - 3 = 2 - 3p \Rightarrow 11p = 5 \Rightarrow p = \frac{5}{11}$ | DM1 A1 | |
| Optimal strategy: play E with probability $\frac{5}{11}$, play F with probability $\frac{6}{11}$ | A1 | |
| Check against row with $-1, 2$: verify this is optimal | A1 | |

**(d)(iii)**

| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Value $= 8\left(\frac{5}{11}\right) - 3 = \frac{40}{11} - \frac{33}{11} = \frac{7}{11}$ | B1 ft | Follow through from (d)(ii) |

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5 Romeo and Juliet play a zero-sum game. The game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for Romeo.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ l | c | c | c | c | }
 & \multicolumn{4}{c}{Juliet} \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 & Strategy & D & E & F \\
\hline
A & 4 & - 4 & 0 &  \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
Romeo & B & - 2 & - 5 & 3 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 & C & 2 & 1 & - 2 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 &  &  &  &  \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item Find the play-safe strategy for each player.
\item Show that there is no stable solution.
\item Explain why Juliet should never play strategy D.
\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item Explain why the following is a suitable pay-off matrix for Juliet.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c | c | }
\hline
4 & 5 & - 1 \\
\hline
0 & - 3 & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\item Hence find the optimal strategy for Juliet.
\item Find the value of the game for Juliet.
\end{enumerate}\end{enumerate}

\hfill \mbox{\textit{AQA D2 2013 Q5 [15]}}