Edexcel D2 2018 June — Question 2 13 marks

Exam BoardEdexcel
ModuleD2 (Decision Mathematics 2)
Year2018
SessionJune
Marks13
PaperDownload PDF ↗
Mark schemeDownload PDF ↗
TopicDynamic Programming
TypeZero-sum game LP formulation
DifficultyModerate -0.8 This is a standard textbook exercise in D2 game theory requiring routine application of well-defined algorithms: finding play-safe strategies (row minima/column maxima), checking for saddle points, applying dominance rules, and converting to LP form using the standard template. All steps are mechanical with no novel problem-solving required, making it easier than average A-level maths.
Spec7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08b Dominance: reduce pay-off matrix7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08f Mixed strategies via LP: reformulate as linear programming problem

2. A two-person zero-sum game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for player A.
B plays 1B plays 2B plays 3B plays 4
A plays 1-325-1
A plays 2-531-1
A plays 3-2542
A plays 42-3-14
  1. Identify the play safe strategies for each player.
  2. State, giving a reason, whether there is a stable solution to this game.
  3. Explain why the game above can be reduced to the following \(3 \times 3\) game.
    - 325
    - 254
    2- 3- 1
  4. Formulate the \(3 \times 3\) game as a linear programming problem for player A, defining your variables clearly and writing the constraints as inequalities.

Question 2:
Part (a)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
A's play-safe strategy: find row minima: A1:\(-3\), A2:\(-5\), A3:\(-2\), A4:\(-3\); maximin \(= -2\), so A plays 3M1 Method of finding row minima and maximising
B's play-safe strategy: find column maxima: B1:\(2\), B2:\(5\), B3:\(5\), B4:\(4\); minimax \(= 2\), so B plays 1A1
Both strategies correctly statedA1
Part (b)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
No stable solution because maximin \((-2) \neq\) minimax \((2)\)B1 Must state reason with values
Part (c)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Column B4 is dominated by column B1 (every entry in B1 \(\leq\) every entry in B4), so B4 is removedB1
Row A2 is dominated by row A1 or A3, so A2 is removedB1 Must correctly identify which row/column is dominated with reason
Part (d)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMark Guidance
Let \(p_1, p_2, p_3\) be the probabilities that A plays 1, 2, 3 respectivelyB1 Variables defined
\(p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1\), \(p_1, p_2, p_3 \geq 0\)B1
Maximise \(V\) subject to:M1 Correct structure
\(-3p_1 - 2p_2 + 2p_3 \geq V\)A1
\(2p_1 + 5p_2 - 3p_3 \geq V\)A1
\(5p_1 + 4p_2 - p_3 \geq V\)A1
All constraints correct with normalisationA1
# Question 2:

## Part (a)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| A's play-safe strategy: find row minima: A1:$-3$, A2:$-5$, A3:$-2$, A4:$-3$; maximin $= -2$, so A plays 3 | M1 | Method of finding row minima and maximising |
| B's play-safe strategy: find column maxima: B1:$2$, B2:$5$, B3:$5$, B4:$4$; minimax $= 2$, so B plays 1 | A1 | |
| Both strategies correctly stated | A1 | |

## Part (b)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| No stable solution because maximin $(-2) \neq$ minimax $(2)$ | B1 | Must state reason with values |

## Part (c)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Column B4 is dominated by column B1 (every entry in B1 $\leq$ every entry in B4), so B4 is removed | B1 | |
| Row A2 is dominated by row A1 or A3, so A2 is removed | B1 | Must correctly identify which row/column is dominated with reason |

## Part (d)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Let $p_1, p_2, p_3$ be the probabilities that A plays 1, 2, 3 respectively | B1 | Variables defined |
| $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$, $p_1, p_2, p_3 \geq 0$ | B1 | |
| Maximise $V$ subject to: | M1 | Correct structure |
| $-3p_1 - 2p_2 + 2p_3 \geq V$ | A1 | |
| $2p_1 + 5p_2 - 3p_3 \geq V$ | A1 | |
| $5p_1 + 4p_2 - p_3 \geq V$ | A1 | |
| All constraints correct with normalisation | A1 | |

---
2. A two-person zero-sum game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for player A.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
 & B plays 1 & B plays 2 & B plays 3 & B plays 4 \\
\hline
A plays 1 & -3 & 2 & 5 & -1 \\
\hline
A plays 2 & -5 & 3 & 1 & -1 \\
\hline
A plays 3 & -2 & 5 & 4 & 2 \\
\hline
A plays 4 & 2 & -3 & -1 & 4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item Identify the play safe strategies for each player.
\item State, giving a reason, whether there is a stable solution to this game.
\item Explain why the game above can be reduced to the following $3 \times 3$ game.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c | c | }
\hline
- 3 & 2 & 5 \\
\hline
- 2 & 5 & 4 \\
\hline
2 & - 3 & - 1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\item Formulate the $3 \times 3$ game as a linear programming problem for player A, defining your variables clearly and writing the constraints as inequalities.
\end{enumerate}

\hfill \mbox{\textit{Edexcel D2 2018 Q2 [13]}}