6 Two people, Rowan and Colleen, play a zero-sum game. The game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for Rowan.
Colleen
| \multirow{4}{*}{Rowan} | Strategy | \(\mathrm { C } _ { 1 }\) | \(\mathrm { C } _ { 2 }\) | \(\mathrm { C } _ { 3 }\) |
| \(\mathrm { R } _ { 1 }\) | -3 | -4 | 1 |
| \(\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 2 } }\) | 1 | 5 | -1 |
| \(\mathbf { R } _ { \mathbf { 3 } }\) | -2 | -3 | 4 |
- Explain the meaning of the term 'zero-sum game'.
- Show that this game has no stable solution.
- Explain why Rowan should never play strategy \(R _ { 1 }\).
- Find the optimal mixed strategy for Rowan.
- Find the value of the game.
| Surname | | | | | | Other Names | | | | | |
| Centre Number | | | | | | Candidate Number | | | | |
| Candidate Signature | | | | | | | | | | |
Unit Decision 2}
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