| Exam Board | Edexcel |
|---|---|
| Module | FD2 AS (Further Decision 2 AS) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Session | June |
| Marks | 14 |
| Paper | Download PDF ↗ |
| Mark scheme | Download PDF ↗ |
| Topic | Dynamic Programming |
| Type | Zero-sum game optimal mixed strategy |
| Difficulty | Standard +0.3 This is a standard textbook exercise in game theory requiring routine application of dominance checking, graphical method for mixed strategies, and value calculation. While it has multiple parts, each step follows a well-defined algorithm taught in FD2 with no novel insight required—slightly easier than average A-level maths. |
| Spec | 7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08b Dominance: reduce pay-off matrix7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method7.08f Mixed strategies via LP: reformulate as linear programming problem |
| \(B\) plays X | \(B\) plays Y | |
| \(A\) plays Q | 2 | -2 |
| \(A\) plays R | -1 | 5 |
| A plays S | 3 | 4 |
| \(A\) plays T | 0 | 2 |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Row minima: \(-2, -1, 3, 0\); max is \(3\). Column maxima: \(3, 5\); min is \(3\) | M1 | Finding row minimums and column maximums; condone one error |
| Row(maximin) \(=\) Col(minimax) \(= 3\), therefore game is stable | A1 | Dependent on all 6 correct values; must see two 3's explicitly compared; cao \((-3)\) is A0 |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Value of game to player \(B\) is \(-3\) | A1 | cao |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| \(\begin{pmatrix} -2 & 1 & 0 \\ 2 & -5 & -2 \end{pmatrix}\) | B1 | cao; must be reduced game with option S removed |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| If \(A\) plays Q: \(B\)'s gains \(= -2p + 2(1-p) = 2 - 4p\) | M1 | Setting up three expressions in terms of \(p\) |
| If \(A\) plays R: \(B\)'s gains \(= p + (-5)(1-p) = -5 + 6p\) | A1 | All three expressions correctly simplified |
| If \(A\) plays T: \(B\)'s gains \(= (-2)(1-p) = -2 + 2p\) | — | — |
| At least two lines correctly drawn | M1 | If values on at least one vertical axis not given, lines must be in right position relative to each other |
| Completely correct graph with correct intersection points at ends where \(p=0\) and \(p=1\) | A1 | Lines must not extend past \(p<0\) and/or \(p>1\) |
| \(2 - 4p = -5 + 6p \Rightarrow p = \frac{7}{10}\) | A1 | Using graph with 3 lines to obtain correct probability |
| \(B\) plays option X with probability \(\frac{7}{10}\) and option Y with probability \(\frac{3}{10}\) | A1ft | Must refer to 'play' and associated probabilities |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| \(6 \times \frac{7}{10} - 5 = -\frac{4}{5}\); value of game to player \(A\) is \(\frac{4}{5}\) | B1 | cao (\(\frac{4}{5}\) or \(0.8\)) |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Player \(A\) should never play option T | B1 | cao |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| If \(A\) plays Q with probability \(q\) and R with probability \(1-q\): \(2q + (-1)(1-q) = \frac{4}{5}\) | M1 | Setting up linear equation with \(V(A)\) from (d)(i) using either \(2q+(-1)(1-q)\) or \(-2q+5(1-q)\) |
| \(q = \frac{3}{5}\); \(A\) plays Q with probability \(\frac{3}{5}\) and R with probability \(\frac{2}{5}\) (play S and T never) | A1 | Must refer to 'play' and associated probabilities |
# Question 3:
## Part (a)(i)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Row minima: $-2, -1, 3, 0$; max is $3$. Column maxima: $3, 5$; min is $3$ | M1 | Finding row minimums and column maximums; condone one error |
| Row(maximin) $=$ Col(minimax) $= 3$, therefore game is stable | A1 | Dependent on all 6 correct values; must see two 3's explicitly compared; cao $(-3)$ is A0 |
## Part (a)(ii)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Value of game to player $B$ is $-3$ | A1 | cao |
## Part (b)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| $\begin{pmatrix} -2 & 1 & 0 \\ 2 & -5 & -2 \end{pmatrix}$ | B1 | cao; must be reduced game with option S removed |
## Part (c)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| If $A$ plays Q: $B$'s gains $= -2p + 2(1-p) = 2 - 4p$ | M1 | Setting up three expressions in terms of $p$ |
| If $A$ plays R: $B$'s gains $= p + (-5)(1-p) = -5 + 6p$ | A1 | All three expressions correctly simplified |
| If $A$ plays T: $B$'s gains $= (-2)(1-p) = -2 + 2p$ | — | — |
| At least two lines correctly drawn | M1 | If values on at least one vertical axis not given, lines must be in right position relative to each other |
| Completely correct graph with correct intersection points at ends where $p=0$ and $p=1$ | A1 | Lines must not extend past $p<0$ and/or $p>1$ |
| $2 - 4p = -5 + 6p \Rightarrow p = \frac{7}{10}$ | A1 | Using graph with 3 lines to obtain correct probability |
| $B$ plays option X with probability $\frac{7}{10}$ and option Y with probability $\frac{3}{10}$ | A1ft | Must refer to 'play' and associated probabilities |
## Part (d)(i)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| $6 \times \frac{7}{10} - 5 = -\frac{4}{5}$; value of game to player $A$ is $\frac{4}{5}$ | B1 | cao ($\frac{4}{5}$ or $0.8$) |
## Part (d)(ii)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Player $A$ should never play option T | B1 | cao |
## Part (d)(iii)
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| If $A$ plays Q with probability $q$ and R with probability $1-q$: $2q + (-1)(1-q) = \frac{4}{5}$ | M1 | Setting up linear equation with $V(A)$ from (d)(i) using either $2q+(-1)(1-q)$ or $-2q+5(1-q)$ |
| $q = \frac{3}{5}$; $A$ plays Q with probability $\frac{3}{5}$ and R with probability $\frac{2}{5}$ (play S and T never) | A1 | Must refer to 'play' and associated probabilities |
3. A two-person zero-sum game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for player $A$.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
& $B$ plays X & $B$ plays Y \\
\hline
$A$ plays Q & 2 & -2 \\
\hline
$A$ plays R & -1 & 5 \\
\hline
A plays S & 3 & 4 \\
\hline
$A$ plays T & 0 & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item Show that this game is stable.
\item State the value of this game to player $B$.
Option S is removed from player A's choices and the reduced game, with option S removed, is no longer stable.
\end{enumerate}\item Write down the reduced pay-off matrix for player $B$.
Let $B$ play option X with probability $p$ and option Y with probability $1 - p$.
\item Use a graphical method to find the optimal value of $p$ and hence find the best strategy for player $B$ in the reduced game.
\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item Find the value of the reduced game to player $A$.
\item State which option player $A$ should never play in the reduced game.
\item Hence find the best strategy for player $A$ in the reduced game.
\end{enumerate}\end{enumerate}
\hfill \mbox{\textit{Edexcel FD2 AS 2023 Q3 [14]}}