OCR Further Discrete 2020 November — Question 2 14 marks

Exam BoardOCR
ModuleFurther Discrete (Further Discrete)
Year2020
SessionNovember
Marks14
PaperDownload PDF ↗
Mark schemeDownload PDF ↗
TopicGroups
TypeNon-group structures
DifficultyChallenging +1.2 This is a game theory question requiring systematic analysis of payoff matrices. While it involves multiple parts (play-safe strategies, weak dominance, mixed strategies, Nash equilibria), each part follows standard algorithmic procedures taught in Further Discrete modules. The graphical method for mixed strategies and checking Nash equilibria are routine applications of learned techniques, making this moderately above average difficulty but not requiring novel mathematical insight.
Spec7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method

2 Annie and Brett play a two-person, simultaneous play game. The table shows the pay-offs for Annie and Brett in the form ( \(a , b\) ). So, for example, if Annie plays strategy K and Brett plays strategy S, Annie wins 2 points and Brett wins 6 points.
Brett
RST
\cline { 3 - 5 } \multirow{3}{*}{Annie}K\(( 7,3 )\)\(( 2,6 )\)\(( 5,3 )\)
\cline { 3 - 5 }L\(( 1,5 )\)\(( 8,2 )\)\(( 2,5 )\)
\cline { 3 - 5 }M\(( 3,2 )\)\(( 1,5 )\)\(( 4,6 )\)
\cline { 3 - 5 }
\cline { 3 - 5 }
    1. Determine the play-safe strategy for Annie.
    2. Show that the play-safe strategy for Brett is T.
    1. If Annie knows that Brett is planning on playing strategy T, which strategy should Annie play to maximise her points?
    2. If Brett knows that Annie is planning on playing the strategy identified in part (b)(i), which strategy should Brett play to maximise his points?
  1. Show that, for Brett, strategy R is weakly dominated.
  2. Using a graphical method, determine the optimal mixed strategy for Brett.
  3. Show that the game has no Nash equilibrium points.

Question 2:
AnswerMarks Guidance
2(a) (i)
K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3) 2
L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5) 1
M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6) 1
AnswerMarks
Play-safe strategy for Annie is KB1
B1
AnswerMarks
[2]May reduce every a value by a constant and/or every b
value by a constant, but not e.g. reducing rows and not
calculating differences, a – b
Row minima 2, 1, 1 (o.e.) seen, on table or written
But not just stating row maximin = 2
K identified as play-safe
AnswerMarks Guidance
2(a) (ii)
K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3)
L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5)
M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6)
Col min for B 2 2 3
T has largest minimum
AnswerMarks
Maximin = max {2, 2, 3} = 3 (so play-safe for Brett is T, as given)M1
A1
AnswerMarks
[2]May reduce every a value by a constant and/or every b
value by a constant, but not e.g. reducing rows and not
calculating differences, a – b
Col minina 2, 2, 3 (o.e.) seen, on table or written
Col maximin = 3
‘max’ or ‘largest’
AnswerMarks Guidance
(7, 3)(2, 6) (5, 3)
(1, 5)(8, 2) (2, 5)
(3, 2)(1, 5) (4, 6)
(7, 3)(2, 6) (5, 3)
(1, 5)(8, 2) (2, 5)
(3, 2)(1, 5) (4, 6)
22 3
2(b) (i)
[1]K
2(b) (ii)
[1]Follow through to col with max b value in row from (b)(i)
2(c) (Column R is weakly dominated by) column T
3 = 3, 5 = 5 and 2 < 6M1
A1
AnswerMarks
[2]T (only)
3, 3 5, 5 and 2 < 6
AnswerMarks Guidance
2(d) Let Brett play S with probability p and T with probability 1 – p
If Annie plays X, Brett expects to win 6p + 3(1 – p) = 3 + 3p
If Annie plays Y, Brett expects to win 2p + 5(1 – p) = 5 – 3p
If Annie plays Z, Brett expects to win 5p + 6(1 – p) = 6 – p
Optimum at p =
1
Play S with probability and T with probability
3
1 2
AnswerMarks
3 3B1
B1
M1
A1FT
AnswerMarks
[4]Three correct expressions (in any form) for expected winnings
in terms of a single variable (which need not be called p)
Graph showing lines (0, 3) to (1, 6)
(0, 5) to (1, 2)
and (0, 6) to (1, 5)
Horizontal axis from 0 to 1 using at least half width of grid
(values 0 and 1 may be implied from lines)
Vertical axis with a scale (at least 2 values marked on axis, or
origin and at least 1 value marked)
or prob corresponding to max point of their lower boundary
1
Interpretation of their p in context, or implied if meaning of p
3
(or 1 – p) was given when setting up equations
AnswerMarks Guidance
2(e) Best outcome in each col for Annie: (K, R), (L, S), (K, T)
Best outcome in each row for Brett: (K, S), (L, R), (L, T), (M, T)
AnswerMarks
No common cell so no Nash equilibriumB1
B1
AnswerMarks
[2](K, R), (L, S) and (K, T) identified as a set in any way
(K, S), (L, R), (L, T) and (M, T) identified as a set in any way
Or one set and verify none of these are optimal for other player
R S T R S T
K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3) K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3)
L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5) L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5)
M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6) M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6)
AnswerMarks Guidance
(7, 3)(2, 6) (5, 3)
(1, 5)(8, 2) (2, 5)
(3, 2)(1, 5) (4, 6)
(7, 3)(2, 6) (5, 3)
(1, 5)(8, 2) (2, 5)
(3, 2)(1, 5) (4, 6)
Question 2:
2 | (a) | (i) | R S T Row min for A
K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3) 2
L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5) 1
M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6) 1
Play-safe strategy for Annie is K | B1
B1
[2] | May reduce every a value by a constant and/or every b
value by a constant, but not e.g. reducing rows and not
calculating differences, a – b
Row minima 2, 1, 1 (o.e.) seen, on table or written
But not just stating row maximin = 2
K identified as play-safe
2 | (a) | (ii) | R S T
K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3)
L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5)
M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6)
Col min for B 2 2 3
T has largest minimum
Maximin = max {2, 2, 3} = 3 (so play-safe for Brett is T, as given) | M1
A1
[2] | May reduce every a value by a constant and/or every b
value by a constant, but not e.g. reducing rows and not
calculating differences, a – b
Col minina 2, 2, 3 (o.e.) seen, on table or written
Col maximin = 3
‘max’ or ‘largest’
(7, 3) | (2, 6) | (5, 3) | 2
(1, 5) | (8, 2) | (2, 5) | 1
(3, 2) | (1, 5) | (4, 6) | 1
(7, 3) | (2, 6) | (5, 3)
(1, 5) | (8, 2) | (2, 5)
(3, 2) | (1, 5) | (4, 6)
2 | 2 | 3
2 | (b) | (i) | K | B1
[1] | K
2 | (b) | (ii) | S | B1 FT
[1] | Follow through to col with max b value in row from (b)(i)
2 | (c) | (Column R is weakly dominated by) column T
3 = 3, 5 = 5 and 2 < 6 | M1
A1
[2] | T (only)
3, 3 5, 5 and 2 < 6
2 | (d) | Let Brett play S with probability p and T with probability 1 – p
If Annie plays X, Brett expects to win 6p + 3(1 – p) = 3 + 3p
If Annie plays Y, Brett expects to win 2p + 5(1 – p) = 5 – 3p
If Annie plays Z, Brett expects to win 5p + 6(1 – p) = 6 – p
Optimum at p =
1
Play S with probability and T with probability
3
1 2
3 3 | B1
B1
M1
A1FT
[4] | Three correct expressions (in any form) for expected winnings
in terms of a single variable (which need not be called p)
Graph showing lines (0, 3) to (1, 6)
(0, 5) to (1, 2)
and (0, 6) to (1, 5)
Horizontal axis from 0 to 1 using at least half width of grid
(values 0 and 1 may be implied from lines)
Vertical axis with a scale (at least 2 values marked on axis, or
origin and at least 1 value marked)
or prob corresponding to max point of their lower boundary
1
Interpretation of their p in context, or implied if meaning of p
3
(or 1 – p) was given when setting up equations
2 | (e) | Best outcome in each col for Annie: (K, R), (L, S), (K, T)
Best outcome in each row for Brett: (K, S), (L, R), (L, T), (M, T)
No common cell so no Nash equilibrium | B1
B1
[2] | (K, R), (L, S) and (K, T) identified as a set in any way
(K, S), (L, R), (L, T) and (M, T) identified as a set in any way
Or one set and verify none of these are optimal for other player
R S T R S T
K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3) K (7, 3) (2, 6) (5, 3)
L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5) L (1, 5) (8, 2) (2, 5)
M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6) M (3, 2) (1, 5) (4, 6)
(7, 3) | (2, 6) | (5, 3)
(1, 5) | (8, 2) | (2, 5)
(3, 2) | (1, 5) | (4, 6)
(7, 3) | (2, 6) | (5, 3)
(1, 5) | (8, 2) | (2, 5)
(3, 2) | (1, 5) | (4, 6)
2 Annie and Brett play a two-person, simultaneous play game. The table shows the pay-offs for Annie and Brett in the form ( $a , b$ ). So, for example, if Annie plays strategy K and Brett plays strategy S, Annie wins 2 points and Brett wins 6 points.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ c c | c | c | c | }
 &  & \multicolumn{3}{c}{Brett} \\
 &  & \multicolumn{1}{c}{R} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{S} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{T} \\
\cline { 3 - 5 }
\multirow{3}{*}{Annie} & K & $( 7,3 )$ & $( 2,6 )$ & $( 5,3 )$ \\
\cline { 3 - 5 }
 & L & $( 1,5 )$ & $( 8,2 )$ & $( 2,5 )$ \\
\cline { 3 - 5 }
 & M & $( 3,2 )$ & $( 1,5 )$ & $( 4,6 )$ \\
\cline { 3 - 5 }
 &  &  &  &  \\
\cline { 3 - 5 }
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item Determine the play-safe strategy for Annie.
\item Show that the play-safe strategy for Brett is T.
\end{enumerate}\item \begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
\item If Annie knows that Brett is planning on playing strategy T, which strategy should Annie play to maximise her points?
\item If Brett knows that Annie is planning on playing the strategy identified in part (b)(i), which strategy should Brett play to maximise his points?
\end{enumerate}\item Show that, for Brett, strategy R is weakly dominated.
\item Using a graphical method, determine the optimal mixed strategy for Brett.
\item Show that the game has no Nash equilibrium points.
\end{enumerate}

\hfill \mbox{\textit{OCR Further Discrete 2020 Q2 [14]}}