OCR D2 2007 June — Question 2 15 marks

Exam BoardOCR
ModuleD2 (Decision Mathematics 2)
Year2007
SessionJune
Marks15
PaperDownload PDF ↗
Mark schemeDownload PDF ↗
TopicMatchings and Allocation
TypeHungarian algorithm with parameters
DifficultyModerate -0.8 This is a straightforward game theory question requiring basic probability expressions, plotting three linear functions, and reading off an intersection point. The concepts are mechanical (expected value, minimax) with no novel problem-solving required. While it has multiple parts, each step follows a standard D2 algorithm with clear procedures, making it easier than average A-level questions.
Spec7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method

2 The table gives the pay-off matrix for a zero-sum game between two players, A my and Bea. The values in the table show the pay-offs for A my.
Bea
\cline { 3 - 5 }Strategy XStrategy YStrategy Z
\cline { 2 - 5 }Strategy P4- 20
\cline { 2 - 5 } A myStrategy Q- 154
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\cline { 2 - 5 }
A my makes a random choice between strategies \(\mathbf { P }\) and \(Q\), choosing strategy \(P\) with probability \(p\) and strategy Q with probability \(1 - \mathrm { p }\).
  1. Write down and simplify an expression for the expected pay-off for Amy when Bea chooses strategy X . Write down similar expressions for the cases when B ea chooses strategy Y and when she chooses strategy \(Z\).
  2. Using graph paper, draw a graph to show A my's expected pay-off against p for each of Bea's choices of strategy. Using your graph, find the optimal value of pfor A my. A my and Bea play the game many times. A my chooses randomly between her strategies using the optimal value for p.
  3. Showing your working, calculate A my's minimum expected pay-off per game. W hy might A my gain more points than this, on average?
  4. W hat is B ea's minimum expected loss per game? How should B ea play to minimise her expected loss?

Question 2:
Part (i)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMarks Guidance
\(4p - (1-p)\)M1 For \(4p - 1(1-p)\) or equivalent, seen or implied
\(= 5p - 1\)A1 For \(5p-1\) or \(-1+5p\) cao
\(-2p + 5(1-p) = 5 - 7p\)B1 For any form of this expression cao
\(4(1-p) = 4 - 4p\)B1 For any form of this expression cao
Part (ii)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMarks Guidance
Graph with horizontal axis from 0 to 1M1 For correct structure to graph with a horizontal axis that extends from 0 to 1, but not more than this, and with consistent scales
Line \(E = 5p-1\) plotted from \((0,-1)\) to \((1,4)\)A1 ft For line \(E = 5p-1\) plotted from \((0,-1)\) to \((1,4)\)
Line \(E = 5-7p\) plotted from \((0,5)\) to \((1,-2)\)A1 ft For line \(E = 5-7p\) plotted from \((0,5)\) to \((1,-2)\)
Line \(E = 4-4p\) plotted from \((0,4)\) to \((1,0)\)A1 ft For line \(E = 4-4p\) plotted from \((0,4)\) to \((1,0)\)
All three lines correct or ft from (i) 4 marks total
\(p = 0.5\)B1 For this or ft their graph
Part (iii)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMarks Guidance
\(5(0.5) - 1\)M1 For substituting their \(p\) into any of their equations (must be seen, cannot be implied from value)
\(= 1.5\) points per gameA1 For 1.5 cao
Bea may not play her best strategyB1 For this or equivalent. Describing a mixed strategy that involves \(Z\)
Part (iv)
AnswerMarks Guidance
AnswerMarks Guidance
1.5B1 ft Accept \(-1.5\), ft from (iii)
If Amy plays using her optimal strategy, Bea should never play strategy \(Z\)M1 For identifying that she should not play \(Z\)
Assuming Bea knows that Amy will make a random choice between \(P\) and \(Q\) so that each has probability 0.5, it does not matter how she chooses between strategies \(X\) and \(Y\)A1 For a full description of how she should play
(If candidate assumes Bea does not know, then Bea should play \(P\) with probability \(\frac{7}{12}\) and \(Q\) with probability \(\frac{5}{12}\)) Alternative answer noted
# Question 2:

## Part (i)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| $4p - (1-p)$ | M1 | For $4p - 1(1-p)$ or equivalent, seen or implied |
| $= 5p - 1$ | A1 | For $5p-1$ or $-1+5p$ cao |
| $-2p + 5(1-p) = 5 - 7p$ | B1 | For any form of this expression cao |
| $4(1-p) = 4 - 4p$ | B1 | For any form of this expression cao |

## Part (ii)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| Graph with horizontal axis from 0 to 1 | M1 | For correct structure to graph with a horizontal axis that extends from 0 to 1, but not more than this, and with consistent scales |
| Line $E = 5p-1$ plotted from $(0,-1)$ to $(1,4)$ | A1 ft | For line $E = 5p-1$ plotted from $(0,-1)$ to $(1,4)$ |
| Line $E = 5-7p$ plotted from $(0,5)$ to $(1,-2)$ | A1 ft | For line $E = 5-7p$ plotted from $(0,5)$ to $(1,-2)$ |
| Line $E = 4-4p$ plotted from $(0,4)$ to $(1,0)$ | A1 ft | For line $E = 4-4p$ plotted from $(0,4)$ to $(1,0)$ |
| All three lines correct or ft from (i) | | 4 marks total |
| $p = 0.5$ | B1 | For this or ft their graph |

## Part (iii)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| $5(0.5) - 1$ | M1 | For substituting their $p$ into any of their equations (must be seen, cannot be implied from value) |
| $= 1.5$ points per game | A1 | For 1.5 cao |
| Bea may not play her best strategy | B1 | For this or equivalent. Describing a mixed strategy that involves $Z$ |

## Part (iv)
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|--------|-------|----------|
| 1.5 | B1 ft | Accept $-1.5$, ft from (iii) |
| If Amy plays using her optimal strategy, Bea should never play strategy $Z$ | M1 | For identifying that she should not play $Z$ |
| Assuming Bea knows that Amy will make a random choice between $P$ and $Q$ so that each has probability 0.5, it does not matter how she chooses between strategies $X$ and $Y$ | A1 | For a full description of how she should play |
| (If candidate assumes Bea does not know, then Bea should play $P$ with probability $\frac{7}{12}$ and $Q$ with probability $\frac{5}{12}$) | | Alternative answer noted |

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2 The table gives the pay-off matrix for a zero-sum game between two players, A my and Bea. The values in the table show the pay-offs for A my.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ l | c | c | c | c | }
 & \multicolumn{4}{c}{Bea} \\
\cline { 3 - 5 }
 &  & Strategy X & Strategy Y & Strategy Z \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 & Strategy P & 4 & - 2 & 0 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
A my & Strategy Q & - 1 & 5 & 4 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 &  &  &  &  \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

A my makes a random choice between strategies $\mathbf { P }$ and $Q$, choosing strategy $P$ with probability $p$ and strategy Q with probability $1 - \mathrm { p }$.\\
(i) Write down and simplify an expression for the expected pay-off for Amy when Bea chooses strategy X . Write down similar expressions for the cases when B ea chooses strategy Y and when she chooses strategy $Z$.\\
(ii) Using graph paper, draw a graph to show A my's expected pay-off against p for each of Bea's choices of strategy. Using your graph, find the optimal value of pfor A my.

A my and Bea play the game many times. A my chooses randomly between her strategies using the optimal value for p.\\
(iii) Showing your working, calculate A my's minimum expected pay-off per game. W hy might A my gain more points than this, on average?\\
(iv) W hat is B ea's minimum expected loss per game? How should B ea play to minimise her expected loss?

\hfill \mbox{\textit{OCR D2 2007 Q2 [15]}}