OCR D2 2007 January — Question 3 8 marks

Exam BoardOCR
ModuleD2 (Decision Mathematics 2)
Year2007
SessionJanuary
Marks8
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Mark schemeDownload PDF ↗
TopicGroups
DifficultyEasy -2.0 This is a straightforward game theory question requiring only basic definitions and routine checking. Part (i) is trivial arithmetic, (ii) involves simple comparison of payoffs, (iii) requires finding maximin/minimax values using standard algorithms, and (iv) needs only conceptual understanding of play-safe strategies. No proof, novel insight, or complex multi-step reasoning required—purely mechanical application of definitions from Decision Mathematics.
Spec7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions

3 Rebecca and Claire repeatedly play a zero-sum game in which they each have a choice of three strategies, \(X , Y\) and \(Z\). The table shows the number of points Rebecca scores for each pair of strategies. \begin{table}[h]
\captionsetup{labelformat=empty} \caption{Claire}
\(X\)\(Y\)\(Z\)
\cline { 2 - 5 }\(X\)5- 31
\cline { 2 - 5 } Rebecca\(Y\)32- 2
\cline { 2 - 5 }\(Z\)- 113
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\end{table}
  1. If both players choose strategy \(X\), how many points will Claire score?
  2. Show that row \(X\) does not dominate row \(Y\) and that column \(Y\) does not dominate column \(Z\).
  3. Find the play-safe strategies. State which strategy is best for Claire if she knows that Rebecca will play safe.
  4. Explain why decreasing the value ' 5 ' when both players choose strategy \(X\) cannot alter the playsafe strategies.

AnswerMarks Guidance
(i)\(-5\) B1
[1]
(ii)Because \(-3 < 2\) in column \(Y\) and \(2 > -2\) in row \(Y\) M1
A1Both of these comparisons and no others
(iii)Play-safe for Rebecca is \(Z\) B1
Play-safe for Claire is \(Y\)B1 Indicating column \(Y\)
Best choice is \(X\)B1 ft The correct choice with their play-safe
[3]
(iv)For Rebecca: \(-1 >\) smaller of \(\{-3\), value that 5 becomes\(\}\) B1
For Claire: \(2 <\) larger of \(\{3\), value that 5 becomes\(\}\)B1 This, or equivalent (but NOT '5 is not in the play-safe column')
[2]
(i) | $-5$ | B1 | $-5$ |
| | [1] | |

(ii) | Because $-3 < 2$ in column $Y$ and $2 > -2$ in row $Y$ | M1 | Either of these, possibly with others |
| | | A1 | Both of these comparisons and no others |

(iii) | Play-safe for Rebecca is $Z$ | B1 | Indicating row $Z$ |
| | Play-safe for Claire is $Y$ | B1 | Indicating column $Y$ |
| | Best choice is $X$ | B1 ft | The correct choice with their play-safe |
| | | [3] | |

(iv) | For Rebecca: $-1 >$ smaller of $\{-3$, value that 5 becomes$\}$ | B1 | This, or equivalent, or 5 is not in the play-safe row |
| | For Claire: $2 <$ larger of $\{3$, value that 5 becomes$\}$ | B1 | This, or equivalent (but NOT '5 is not in the play-safe column') |
| | | [2] | |

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3 Rebecca and Claire repeatedly play a zero-sum game in which they each have a choice of three strategies, $X , Y$ and $Z$.

The table shows the number of points Rebecca scores for each pair of strategies.

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{center}
\captionsetup{labelformat=empty}
\caption{Claire}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c | r | r | r | }
\hline
 & \multicolumn{1}{|c|}{$X$} & \multicolumn{1}{c|}{$Y$} & \multicolumn{1}{c|}{$Z$} &  \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 & $X$ & 5 & - 3 & 1 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
Rebecca & $Y$ & 3 & 2 & - 2 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 & $Z$ & - 1 & 1 & 3 \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
 &  &  &  &  \\
\cline { 2 - 5 }
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

(i) If both players choose strategy $X$, how many points will Claire score?\\
(ii) Show that row $X$ does not dominate row $Y$ and that column $Y$ does not dominate column $Z$.\\
(iii) Find the play-safe strategies. State which strategy is best for Claire if she knows that Rebecca will play safe.\\
(iv) Explain why decreasing the value ' 5 ' when both players choose strategy $X$ cannot alter the playsafe strategies.

\hfill \mbox{\textit{OCR D2 2007 Q3 [8]}}