| Exam Board | AQA |
|---|---|
| Module | Further AS Paper 2 Discrete (Further AS Paper 2 Discrete) |
| Session | Specimen |
| Marks | 11 |
| Paper | Download PDF ↗ |
| Mark scheme | Download PDF ↗ |
| Topic | Dynamic Programming |
| Type | Zero-sum game optimal mixed strategy |
| Difficulty | Standard +0.3 This is a standard textbook zero-sum game question requiring routine application of dominance, play-safe strategies, and 2×2 reduction to find optimal mixed strategies. While it involves multiple parts and careful arithmetic, the techniques are algorithmic with no novel insight required, making it slightly easier than average for Further Maths. |
| Spec | 7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08b Dominance: reduce pay-off matrix7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method |
| \multirow{2}{*}{} | Albert | |||
| Strategy | \(\boldsymbol { x }\) | \(Y\) | \(z\) | |
| \multirow{3}{*}{Victoria} | \(P\) | 3 | -1 | 1 |
| \(Q\) | -2 | 0 | 1 | |
| \(R\) | 4 | -1 | -1 | |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Row minima: \(-1, -2, (-1)\); Column maxima: \(4, 0, (1)\) | M1 | Identifies correctly all three row minima or all three (two) column maxima |
| \(\max(\text{row min}) = -1\); \(\min(\text{col max}) = 0\) | A1 | Determines correctly max(row min) and min(col max) |
| Victoria plays \(R\) (or \(P\)); Albert plays \(Y\) | A1 (CAO) | Correct play-safe strategies for each player |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Albert should never play \(Z\) because strategy \(Y\) dominates strategy \(Z\) | E1 | Identifies strategy and justifies with reference to dominance |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Victoria should never play \(P\) because strategy \(R\) dominates strategy \(P\) | B1 | States correctly that strategy \(R\) dominates strategy \(P\) |
| Let Victoria play \(Q\) with probability \(p\) and \(R\) with probability \(1-p\) | M1 | Introduces and defines a probability variable |
| \(X\): expected gain for Victoria \(= -2p + 4(1-p) = 4 - 6p\) | A1 | Finds correctly both expected gain expressions for Victoria |
| \(Y\): expected gain for Victoria \(= -(1-p) = p - 1\) | ||
| No stable solution, so optimal value of \(p\): \(4 - 6p = p - 1\), giving \(p = \frac{5}{7}\) | A1F | States no stable solution; sets expressions equal; solves correctly |
| Victoria plays \(Q\) with probability \(\frac{5}{7}\) and \(R\) with probability \(\frac{2}{7}\) | E1 | Interprets solution giving optimal mixed strategy for Victoria |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| \(4 - 6 \times \frac{5}{7} = -\frac{2}{7}\) or \(\frac{5}{7} - 1 = -\frac{2}{7}\) | B1F | Substitutes value of \(p\) into expected gain expression giving value of game |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
| Expected pay-off for Victoria will only be \(-\frac{2}{7}\) if Albert plays an optimal mixed strategy between \(X\) and \(Y\) | E1 | Recognises Victoria can improve on value of game if Albert does not play optimal mixed strategy |
# Question 6:
## Part 6(a):
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Row minima: $-1, -2, (-1)$; Column maxima: $4, 0, (1)$ | M1 | Identifies correctly all three row minima or all three (two) column maxima |
| $\max(\text{row min}) = -1$; $\min(\text{col max}) = 0$ | A1 | Determines correctly max(row min) and min(col max) |
| Victoria plays $R$ (or $P$); Albert plays $Y$ | A1 (CAO) | Correct play-safe strategies for each player |
## Part 6(b):
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Albert should never play $Z$ because strategy $Y$ dominates strategy $Z$ | E1 | Identifies strategy and justifies with reference to dominance |
## Part 6(c)(i):
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Victoria should never play $P$ because strategy $R$ dominates strategy $P$ | B1 | States correctly that strategy $R$ dominates strategy $P$ |
| Let Victoria play $Q$ with probability $p$ and $R$ with probability $1-p$ | M1 | Introduces and defines a probability variable |
| $X$: expected gain for Victoria $= -2p + 4(1-p) = 4 - 6p$ | A1 | Finds correctly both expected gain expressions for Victoria |
| $Y$: expected gain for Victoria $= -(1-p) = p - 1$ | | |
| No stable solution, so optimal value of $p$: $4 - 6p = p - 1$, giving $p = \frac{5}{7}$ | A1F | States no stable solution; sets expressions equal; solves correctly |
| Victoria plays $Q$ with probability $\frac{5}{7}$ and $R$ with probability $\frac{2}{7}$ | E1 | Interprets solution giving optimal mixed strategy for Victoria |
## Part 6(c)(ii):
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| $4 - 6 \times \frac{5}{7} = -\frac{2}{7}$ or $\frac{5}{7} - 1 = -\frac{2}{7}$ | B1F | Substitutes value of $p$ into expected gain expression giving value of game |
## Part 6(c)(iii):
| Answer | Mark | Guidance |
|--------|------|----------|
| Expected pay-off for Victoria will only be $-\frac{2}{7}$ if Albert plays an optimal mixed strategy between $X$ and $Y$ | E1 | Recognises Victoria can improve on value of game if Albert does not play optimal mixed strategy |
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6 Victoria and Albert play a zero-sum game. The game is represented by the following pay-off matrix for Victoria.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\multirow{2}{*}{} & & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Albert} \\
\hline
& Strategy & $\boldsymbol { x }$ & $Y$ & $z$ \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{*}{Victoria} & $P$ & 3 & -1 & 1 \\
\hline
& $Q$ & -2 & 0 & 1 \\
\hline
& $R$ & 4 & -1 & -1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
6
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item Find the play-safe strategies for each player.\\
6
\item State, with a reason, the strategy that Albert should never play.\\
6
\item (i) Determine an optimal mixed strategy for Victoria.\\[0pt]
[5 marks]\\
6 (c) (ii) Find the value of the game for Victoria.\\
6 (c) (iii) State an assumption that must made in order that your answer for part (c)(ii) is the maximum expected pay-off that Victoria can achieve.
\end{enumerate}
\hfill \mbox{\textit{AQA Further AS Paper 2 Discrete Q6 [11]}}