| Exam Board | Edexcel |
|---|---|
| Module | D2 (Decision Mathematics 2) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Session | June |
| Marks | 16 |
| Paper | Download PDF ↗ |
| Mark scheme | Download PDF ↗ |
| Topic | Groups |
| Difficulty | Easy -1.8 This is a standard game theory question from Decision Mathematics requiring only routine application of textbook algorithms (finding stable solutions, dominance reduction, solving 2×2 games). The topic metadata appears incorrect—this is clearly Decision Mathematics, not Groups from Further Pure. The mechanical nature and step-by-step structure make it significantly easier than average A-level questions. |
| Spec | 7.08a Pay-off matrix: zero-sum games7.08c Pure strategies: play-safe strategies and stable solutions7.08d Nash equilibrium: identification and interpretation7.08e Mixed strategies: optimal strategy using equations or graphical method |
| Greg plays 1 | Greg plays 2 | Greg plays 3 | |
| Rani plays 1 | - 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Rani plays 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Rani plays 3 | 2 | 4 | - 5 |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
| The gains (or losses) made by one player are exactly balanced by the losses (or gains) made by the other player. | B1 | Either: losses of one player balanced by gains of the other, or total points scored by both is zero |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
| \(5\) | B1 | CAO |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
| Row minimum \(\{-3, 0, -5\}\), Row maximin \(= 0\) | M1 | Clear attempt to find Row maximin and Column minimax (row minimums or column maximums correct, or at least four of six values stated correctly) |
| Column maximum \(\{2, 4, 2\}\), Column minimax \(= 2\) | A1 | Correct Row maximin and Column minimax (dependent on all row mins and column maxs correct) |
| \(0 \neq 2\) so no stable solution | A1 | CAO – states \(0 \neq 2\) and draws correct conclusion |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
| Column 1 dominates column 2 so remove column 2 | B1 | CAO (accept reduced matrix or 'column 1 dominates column 2' or column crossed out) |
| \(\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 0 & -2 \\ -2 & -1 & 5 \end{pmatrix}\) | B1ft, B1 | Either \(3\times2\) matrix with correct values for G (all signs changed correctly) or \(2\times3\) matrix with correct values for G; d3B1: CAO |
| Answer | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
| Let \(p\) = probability that Greg plays new row 1. If R plays 1: G's expected winnings \(= 3p - 2(1-p)\ (= 5p-2)\); If R plays 2: \(= 0p - 1(1-p)\ (= p-1)\); If R plays 3: \(= -2p + 5(1-p)\ (= -7p+5)\) | M1, A1 | Setting up all three probability expressions (allow \(p-1\)); CAO (condone incorrect simplification) |
| Graph with three lines, correct slant direction and relative intersection | B2, 1ft, 0 | Attempt at three lines; CAO \(0\leq p\leq1\), scaling correct and clear |
| \(p - 1 = -7p + 5 \Rightarrow 8p = 6 \Rightarrow p = \frac{3}{4}\) | DM1, A1 | Finding correct optimal point; must have three lines and set up equation for \(0\leq p\leq1\); CSO |
| G should play 1 with probability \(\frac{3}{4}\), 2 never, and play 3 with probability \(\frac{1}{4}\) | A1ft | All three options listed must fit from their \(p\); dependent on both previous M marks |
| Value of game to G is \(-\frac{1}{4}\) | A1 | CAO \(\left(-\frac{1}{4}\right)\) |
# Question 2:
## Part (a)
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| The gains (or losses) made by one player are exactly balanced by the losses (or gains) made by the other player. | B1 | Either: losses of one player balanced by gains of the other, **or** total points scored by both is zero |
## Part (b)
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| $5$ | B1 | CAO |
## Part (c)
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Row minimum $\{-3, 0, -5\}$, Row maximin $= 0$ | M1 | Clear attempt to find Row maximin and Column minimax (row minimums or column maximums correct, **or** at least four of six values stated correctly) |
| Column maximum $\{2, 4, 2\}$, Column minimax $= 2$ | A1 | Correct Row maximin **and** Column minimax (dependent on all row mins and column maxs correct) |
| $0 \neq 2$ so no stable solution | A1 | CAO – states $0 \neq 2$ and draws correct conclusion |
## Part (d)
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Column 1 dominates column 2 so remove column 2 | B1 | CAO (accept reduced matrix or 'column 1 dominates column 2' or column crossed out) |
| $\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 0 & -2 \\ -2 & -1 & 5 \end{pmatrix}$ | B1ft, B1 | Either $3\times2$ matrix with correct values for G (all signs changed correctly) or $2\times3$ matrix with correct values for G; d3B1: CAO |
## Part (e)
| Answer/Working | Marks | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Let $p$ = probability that Greg plays new row 1. If R plays 1: G's expected winnings $= 3p - 2(1-p)\ (= 5p-2)$; If R plays 2: $= 0p - 1(1-p)\ (= p-1)$; If R plays 3: $= -2p + 5(1-p)\ (= -7p+5)$ | M1, A1 | Setting up all three probability expressions (allow $p-1$); CAO (condone incorrect simplification) |
| Graph with three lines, correct slant direction and relative intersection | B2, 1ft, 0 | Attempt at three lines; CAO $0\leq p\leq1$, scaling correct and clear |
| $p - 1 = -7p + 5 \Rightarrow 8p = 6 \Rightarrow p = \frac{3}{4}$ | DM1, A1 | Finding correct optimal point; must have three lines and set up equation for $0\leq p\leq1$; CSO |
| G should play 1 with probability $\frac{3}{4}$, 2 never, and play 3 with probability $\frac{1}{4}$ | A1ft | All three options listed must fit from their $p$; dependent on both previous M marks |
| Value of game to G is $-\frac{1}{4}$ | A1 | CAO $\left(-\frac{1}{4}\right)$ |
---
2. Rani and Greg play a zero-sum game. The pay-off matrix shows the number of points that Rani scores for each combination of strategies.
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ | c | c | c | c | }
\hline
& Greg plays 1 & Greg plays 2 & Greg plays 3 \\
\hline
Rani plays 1 & - 3 & 1 & 2 \\
\hline
Rani plays 2 & 0 & 2 & 1 \\
\hline
Rani plays 3 & 2 & 4 & - 5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\begin{enumerate}[label=(\alph*)]
\item Explain what the term 'zero-sum game' means.
\item State the number of points that Greg scores if he plays his strategy 3 and Rani plays her strategy 3.
\item Verify that there is no stable solution to this game.
\item Reduce the game so that Greg has only two possible strategies. Write down the reduced pay-off matrix for Greg.
\item Find the best strategy for Greg and the value of the game to him.
\end{enumerate}
\hfill \mbox{\textit{Edexcel D2 2015 Q2 [16]}}